Growth, capital allocation, and the difference between building a bigger company and creating more value per share
Generation Development Group (GDG) has been one of our most successful Australian investments.
We first invested many years ago, when the business was smaller, simpler and substantially less valuable. Over the period that followed, GDG has grown in value roughly ten times as Generation Life developed from a niche investment-bond business into the dominant participant in its market and management assembled a broader Australian wealth-management group around it.
Success, however, is not a reason to stop analysing.
If anything, a large gain makes capital-allocation discipline even more important. The relevant question is never how much money we have already made.
It is:
What is the single best use of the next dollar from here?
That discipline led us to sell approximately 40% of our GDG position more than a year ago, at prices more than double where the shares trade today.
That decision has been vindicated.
But it is important to understand why we sold.
It was not because we had suddenly lost confidence in Generation Life or believed GDG had become a poor business.
Quite the opposite.
The problem was price—and, increasingly, the forces driving that price.
When markets get ahead of businesses
During 2025, GDG became caught up in a powerful bull market surrounding high-growth companies, particularly businesses where investors were willing to pay increasingly high prices for future growth well before that growth had fully translated into earnings or cash flow.
GDG had many of the characteristics that market wanted:
rapid FUM growth, strong structural themes, successful acquisitions, an expanding addressable market and the prospect of substantial future operating leverage.
Then another source of demand arrived.
GDG entered the S&P/ASX 300 in March 2025 and was subsequently added to the S&P/ASX 200 effective 24 April 2025.
Index inclusion matters because passive funds tracking those indices must acquire the stock.
And active investors know that.
The result can become reflexive.
Passive funds buy because the company has entered the index. More nimble active investors buy beforehand because they know passive funds will eventually be forced buyers. That demand pushes the share price higher, which can itself reinforce enthusiasm and attract further momentum capital.
This was not merely theoretical. WAM Research subsequently described GDG’s index inclusion as producing a significant valuation rerating driven by substantial passive index-related buying.
By mid-2025, another fund manager noted that GDG had risen around 155% over twelve months and approximately 35% in a single month, while arguing that passive catch-up buying had amplified the move.
We were watching the same dynamics.
Our valuation suggested that the share price had reached approximately intrinsic value.
Ordinarily, reaching IV does not necessarily mean we must sell a great business.
But this time there were additional considerations.
We expected some investors who had bought ahead of index inclusion to sell once the mechanical index demand had passed.
We also expected the expiry of escrow arrangements associated with acquisitions and equity issuance to release additional stock into the market.
And we were uncomfortable with the increasingly speculative enthusiasm surrounding high-growth shares generally.
So we reduced our position by approximately 40%.
That was not a prediction that GDG’s business would deteriorate.
After holding the stock for 8 years, we were looking to partly exit our position.
Our assessment was that the marginal buyer of the shares had changed and that the balance between buyers and sellers would shift significantly. This was ripe time to exit.
Over the following year, selling came from several directions.
Index-related demand normalised.
Some active investors who had anticipated the passive flows no longer had a reason to remain.
Escrow restrictions ended.
The Evidentia acquisition disappointed relative to earlier expectations.
Near-term costs and cap ex increased.
Growth stocks generally lost some of their valuation premium.
And eventually the market moved from giving GDG management the benefit of the doubt to withholding it almost entirely.
We think much of that selling cycle has now run its course.
That matters because today we face almost the reverse situation.
Over the past month we have again been adding to our holding.
We now own approximately 70% of our original position, and we may buy more.
The shares we once sold around intrinsic value are now trading at what we believe is a substantial discount to it.
There is no contradiction.
A great business can be a poor investment at one price and an excellent investment at another.
The company is bigger—but is each share more valuable?
GDG today is not the same company we originally bought.
Generation Life remains an exceptional franchise, but the Group is now larger, more acquisitive and structurally more complicated.
It owns Generation Life, Evidentia and Lonsec.
It carries a sizeable central Corporate structure.
Executive remuneration and share-based compensation are materially larger than they once were.
And Generation Life is entering an unusually heavy investment cycle.
That changes the investment question.
For much of GDG’s rise, investors were willing to capitalise future growth well in advance.
The FY26 result challenged that relationship.
Funds Under Management (FUM) grew strongly.
Revenue grew.
Underlying profit grew.
But earnings per share barely moved.
That distinction matters.
A company can become bigger without each share becoming proportionately more valuable.
For long-term owners, the relevant chain is not simply:
FUM → revenue → profit.
It is:
FUM → revenue → EBITDA → capital expenditure → Corporate overhead → employee compensation → dilution → tax → owner earnings per share.
That is where our recent work on GDG has concentrated.
And it explains much of the market’s current scepticism.
Evidentia changed the burden of proof
The first major issue is Evidentia.
The acquisition has so far been less impressive than its original narrative suggested.
Management initially communicated expectations of substantially greater scalability and considerably higher margins over time.
Instead, FY26 revealed a business with approximately A$40.5 billion of FUM, excellent inflows and clear competitive momentum—but also a surprisingly large employee cost base.
That changed the investment question from:
“How quickly can Evidentia grow FUM?”
to:
“How many additional employees are required to service each additional dollar of FUM?”
Those are very different questions.
If Evidentia grows from approximately A$40 billion toward A$60–70 billion of FUM while headcount rises only modestly, the business could generate powerful operating leverage.
If FUM growth requires broadly proportionate increases in portfolio managers, analysts, investment consultants, relationship managers and support staff, Evidentia is economically closer to a high-quality professional-services or conventional asset-management business than a scalable platform.
The difference is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in valuation.
The September 2026 quarter provided further evidence that Evidentia’s competitive position remains sound.
FUM reached A$41.7 billion and quarterly net inflows were A$1.54 billion. The latest industry data showed Evidentia growing at around 1.6 times the managed-account market.
But the update did not tell us what we most want to know.
There was no granular disclosure of employee numbers, employment expense or incremental margins.
So the market is still refusing to assume the operating leverage management originally contemplated.
We think that is reasonable.
Evidentia has proved it can gather assets. It has not yet proved that it can gather assets materially faster than it gathers employees.
Our own valuation does not require the very high margins contemplated in some of the original acquisition commentary.
We model a much more conservative outcome.
But even our valuation assumes the business eventually demonstrates meaningful operating leverage.
If it does not, Evidentia is worth less than we currently estimate.
Evidentia also changed the way the market views future acquisitions
This issue extends well beyond Evidentia itself.
GDG has repeatedly indicated that acquisitions remain part of its strategy.
Ordinarily, acquisition optionality can be valuable.
Today we suspect the market may be treating it as the opposite.
Investors may effectively be saying:
Prove that the businesses you have already acquired create value per share before buying another one.
We think that is a fair challenge.
If management underestimated Evidentia’s labour intensity or overestimated its operating leverage, investors naturally ask how much confidence they should place in assumptions surrounding the next acquisition.
Were the original margin expectations too optimistic?
Were integration requirements underestimated?
Was the business structurally more labour intensive than anticipated?
These questions raise the cost of capital for future M&A even before another transaction occurs.
The market may therefore be assigning negative value to acquisition optionality.
That is unusual—and potentially important.
Generation Life is going from strength to strength
Against those concerns sits what we regard as GDG’s highest-quality asset.
Generation Life’s economics are unusual and powerful.
Investment Bonds are sticky, long-duration products.
Clients commonly hold them for many years.
They solve genuine taxation, estate-planning and intergenerational-wealth problems.
Generation Life also possesses dominant distribution and market leadership.
The September quarter strengthened that thesis substantially.
Generation Life reported record quarterly sales inflows of A$518 million, up 57% on the prior corresponding period and 17% above the previous quarterly record.
Net inflows reached A$427 million.
Closing Investment Bond FUM reached approximately A$6.38 billion.
Even more importantly, virtually all the quarterly FUM increase was organic.
Generation Life began the quarter with A$5.95 billion of FUM, received A$518 million of sales, experienced withdrawals and maturities of approximately A$91 million, recorded only A$4 million of investment growth, and finished at A$6.382 billion.
That is remarkably clean growth.
The latest available industry data also showed Generation Life capturing 66% of quarterly Investment Bond inflows, while twelve-month inflow share reached 59%.
Industry inflows themselves were up 55% year on year.
This is not merely a business stealing share from a stagnant industry.
The industry itself is growing rapidly, while Generation Life is taking a disproportionate amount of the incremental business.
We previously assumed Generation Life’s FUM market share would eventually plateau in the mid-40s.
We now think that was too conservative.
If a company persistently captures approximately 55–65% of new industry flows while owning materially less than half of the installed FUM base, its FUM market share should continue rising unless retention or investment performance deteriorates.
We now think 48–50% FUM market share over time is a more reasonable base-case range.
But shareholders must fund the next stage first
Generation Life also presents the second major reason for current market scepticism.
It is about to spend heavily.
We assume capital expenditure equal to approximately:
15% of revenue in each of the next two years
before normalisation.
That amounts to potentially $33 million in just 2 years (and possibly much higher if capex budget blows out).
For a business investors commonly describe as “asset light,” that is meaningful.
Management is investing in technology, digital capability, product infrastructure and distribution architecture intended to support a much larger future business.
That investment may prove extremely valuable.
But shareholders pay for it today.
The appropriate question is therefore not simply:
“Why is capex high?”
It is:
“What return will shareholders eventually earn on that capital?”
If infrastructure being built today can support A$15 billion, A$20 billion or substantially more of future Investment Bond FUM without proportionate further capital requirements, the return could be excellent.
If capex remains permanently elevated, owner earnings will be materially lower than headline EBITDA suggests.
Consistent with management’s guidance, our model assumes that the heavy FY27–28 investment cycle actually ends.
FY29 will become an important test. In the meantime, the market is not pricing in the future ROI on the capex. It isn’t giving GDG management the benefit of the doubt.
The invisible fourth division: Head Office
GDG owns three attractive operating businesses.
But economically there is a fourth:
Corporate Head Office.
Unlike the others, it produces negative earnings.
For valuation purposes we assume approximately A$12.7 million of gross recurring Corporate overhead in Year 1, including share-based compensation, increasing by around A$1.5 million annually.
In our valuation, the negative value of Corporate is approximately:
A$275 million.
That is substantial.
It creates a necessary question:
What are shareholders receiving for this expense?
A listed financial-services group clearly requires finance, risk, legal, treasury, technology, people and governance infrastructure.
But GDG’s central structure also exists partly to identify, acquire, integrate and allocate capital among businesses.
So the quality of acquisition decisions matters enormously.
If Head Office deploys capital into assets that become worth significantly more than their purchase price, the cost can be justified.
If acquisitions simply make GDG larger without creating superior per-share economics, Corporate becomes a tax on otherwise excellent franchises.
Share-based compensation is part of that cost
FY26 share-based compensation (SBC) was approximately A$4.4 million, meaningful relative to underlying earnings.
A substantial component of senior executive equity compensation sits within the Corporate cost structure.
We do not regard it as free merely because it is non-cash.
Giving an employee shares instead of cash still transfers economic value away from existing shareholders.
The accounting can be confusing because non-cash SBC compensation may subsequently be added back in cash-flow statements.
Our approach is simpler:
SBC is an economic expense.
Separately, we also monitor dilution from outstanding employee rights. Currently (after this month’s allocation), there are roughly 7 million unquoted employee performance rights with a face value of over $20 million (and much higher intrinsic value). Once exercised, these will further dilute ordinary shareholders.
So the issue is:
Is the increasingly expensive central organisation creating enough incremental value to justify its cost?
That question is now reflected explicitly in our valuation.
The valuation has become unusual
Our current segment valuations are approximately:
Generation Life: A$1.7 billion
Evidentia: A$700 million
Lonsec: A$500 million
Corporate / Head Office: negative A$275 million
That produces estimated equity value of approximately:
A$2.625 billion.
Against this, GDG’s market capitalisation is around A$1.24 billion using the price at which we performed this analysis.
The difference is substantial.
But there is a more revealing (albeit simplistic) way to frame it.
Take Generation Life:
A$1.70 billion
and deduct our entire negative value for Corporate:
A$275 million
leaving:
A$1.425 billion.
That alone exceeds the market capitalisation we used in our analysis.
In other words:
The market is valuing GDG below our assessed value of the Generation Life segment after deducting the full Corporate cost centre.
The implied market value of the Evidentia and Lonsec segments combined is therefore approximately:
negative A$185 million.
Our combined valuation of the two businesses is:
A$1.2 billion.
That is the valuation gap.
Are Evidentia and Lonsec really worth less than zero?
Markets do not literally value conglomerates as four independent boxes.
Some of this discount undoubtedly represents management credibility.
Some represents acquisition risk.
Some represents Corporate cost.
Some represents uncertainty around Generation Life’s capex returns.
Some represents the market’s lack of understanding of how to value the recurring tax benefit which arises due to peculiarities in taxation of life insurance groups. (GDG has recently shifted accounting recognition of this item above the line and now treat it as revenue.)
And some represents the possibility that Evidentia never produces the operating leverage originally contemplated.
So it would be too simplistic to say:
“The market is giving us A$1.2 billion of assets for free.”
The market is applying a broad capital-allocation discount across the entire structure.
The more useful question is:
Has that discount become excessive?
We increasingly think it has.
Lonsec is hardly a worthless asset
The September quarter showed continued strong research demand.
Products researched reached 2,055, up 10%.
iRate subscribers reached 5,900, up 13%.
SuperRatings average spend per active client increased 11% to approximately A$147,000.
Lonsec Governance Solutions has also begun trials with prospective customers.
This is a mature, highly recurring, capital-light research and ratings franchise.
Our valuation of approximately A$500 million does not require a transformational outcome.
It assumes continued solid growth and durable margins.
Evidentia remains uncertain—but not worthless
We are more cautious here.
Evidentia still needs to prove scalability.
But it also has A$41.7 billion of FUM, generated A$1.54 billion of quarterly net inflows and continues to grow materially faster than its underlying market.
Its problem is not demand.
Its problem is proving the incremental economics of that demand.
Our A$700 million valuation assumes meaningful but far from heroic operating leverage.
If that leverage does not emerge, the valuation falls.
But zero—or less than zero—would require a materially more pessimistic assessment than the current operating evidence appears to support.
Has the selling finally run its course?
This is impossible to know precisely.
Markets do not ring a bell when technical selling ends.
But the character of the shareholder flows today appears very different from that of 2025.
A year ago, we saw multiple reasons for incremental supply to emerge:
the reversal of speculative growth enthusiasm;
active investors unwinding positions accumulated ahead of passive index demand;
escrow expiries and acquisition-related holders becoming free to sell;
disappointment around Evidentia;
and eventually a much broader rerating of expectations.
A share price that once incorporated almost everything going right now appears to incorporate a great deal going wrong.
Meanwhile, the operating franchises have continued growing.
That is the setup we prefer.
We do not need momentum to continue.
We need price to be materially below conservative intrinsic value.
What would make us wrong?
A valuation gap alone is not sufficient reason to invest.
Several developments could invalidate our thesis.
Generation Life’s heavy capex may fail to earn acceptable returns.
Its exceptional inflow share could prove temporary.
Evidentia could remain permanently labour intensive.
Corporate costs could continue rising without genuine scale economies.
Share-based compensation could remain excessive.
Management could undertake another major acquisition before demonstrating that the enlarged Group can convert existing growth into superior owner earnings per share.
Any of these outcomes could reduce intrinsic value materially.
That is why we have spent so much time decomposing GDG into its constituent businesses.
The interesting thing about the current price is that we do not think the investment requires perfection.
Our thesis requires something much less demanding:
Generation Life must continue doing broadly what it is already doing.
Lonsec must remain a solid, durable franchise.
Evidentia needs to demonstrate some credible operating leverage—not extraordinary margins.
And management needs to show greater discipline around Corporate costs, SBC and future acquisitions.
We think that hurdle is considerably lower than the valuation currently implies.
Selling was right. Buying again can also be right.
Investment decisions should not become ideological.
We sold approximately 40% of our GDG position when the shares traded at more than twice today’s price.
As noted above, we sold even though the price was approximately equal to our estimate of intrinsic value because we were actively seeking to sell part of our position and our view of market mechanics and speculative enthusiasm necessitated a sale at the time.
Today the equation is almost the reverse.
The technical forces that once supported the share price appear largely to have washed through.
The share price is dramatically lower.
The September-quarter operating data are encouraging.
Generation Life is stronger.
Evidentia’s scalability remains unresolved, but its competitive position and inflows remain intact.
Lonsec continues to perform well.
And much of the market’s disappointment is now reflected in the price.
So we are buying again.
We currently hold approximately 70% of our original position and may increase it further.
Growth is not the same as compounding
GDG has become an unusually useful investment case study.
It demonstrates why investors should not confuse:
bigger FUM with greater value
higher revenue with higher owner earnings
acquisitions with value creation
EBITDA with free cash flow
index demand with intrinsic value
or
management growth ambitions with per-share compounding.
The wealth created by a company ultimately belongs to shareholders only after every competing claim has been satisfied:
employees, capital expenditure, Head Office, lenders, tax authorities and new shareholders created through equity compensation.
That is why we increasingly focus on:
owner earnings per diluted share.
GDG’s underlying franchises remain strong.
Generation Life may be stronger than at any point in its history.
Lonsec remains a high-quality cash-generating business.
Evidentia has work to do, but continues winning assets and clients.
The market’s scepticism is therefore understandable.
But price matters.
At the valuation we are currently seeing, the market appears to be demanding proof before assigning meaningful value to businesses that are already generating substantial earnings.
That creates the opportunity.
A year ago, management and the share price were receiving almost every benefit of the doubt.
Today they are receiving very little.
At these prices, we do not think investors need to give them very much either.
Disclosure: We own shares in Generation Development Group Limited (ASX: GDG). We have bought and sold GDG shares at different times and prices and may buy or sell shares in the future without notice.
Disclaimer: This article reflects our analysis and opinions and is provided for general information only. It does not constitute financial, investment, legal or taxation advice and does not take into account the objectives, financial situation or needs of any person. Valuations are inherently uncertain and depend on assumptions that may prove incorrect. Investors should conduct their own research and obtain appropriate professional advice before making investment decisions.